Translated from GegenStandpunkt 3-25
US military strategy in the Indo-Pacific
America secures world peace –
with a perfect world war scenario against ChinaWhen the American world power takes a strategic look at the globe, it identifies one region as being of outstanding importance. Republicans and Democrats are in complete agreement on this point in an otherwise deeply divided nation. The Biden administration, like its predecessors, certainly claimed this region for itself:
“The United States is an Indo-Pacific power. The region, stretching from our Pacific coastline to the Indian Ocean, is home to more than half of the world’s people, nearly two-thirds of the world’s economy, and seven of the world’s largest militaries. More members of the U.S. military are based in the region than in any other outside the United States. It supports more than three million American jobs and is the source of nearly $900 billion in foreign direct investment in the United States....Two-way trade between the United States and the region totaled $1.75 trillion in 2020, and it supports more than five million Indo-Pacific jobs. Foreign direct investment from the United States totaled more than $969 billion in 2020 and has nearly doubled in the last decade.... In the years ahead, as the region drives as much as two-thirds of global economic growth, its influence will only grow—as will its importance to the United States. ...The United States has long recognized the Indo-Pacific as vital to our security and prosperity. Our ties were forged two centuries ago, when Americans came to the region seeking commercial opportunities, and grew with the arrival of Asian immigrants to the United States. The Second World War reminded the United States that our country could only be secure if Asia was, too. And so in the post-war era, the United States solidified our ties with the region, through ironclad treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines, and Thailand, laying the foundation of security that allowed regional democracies to flourish. Those ties expanded as the United States supported the region’s premier organizations, particularly the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); developed close trade and investment relationships; and committed to uphold international law and norms, from human rights to freedom of navigation. The passage of time has underscored the strategic necessity of the United States’ consistent role. At the end of the Cold War, the United States considered but rejected the idea of withdrawing our military presence, understanding that the region held strategic value that would only grow in the 21st century. Since then, administrations of both political parties have shared a commitment to the region. The George W. Bush Administration understood Asia’s growing importance and engaged closely with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, and India. The Obama Administration significantly accelerated American prioritization of Asia, investing new diplomatic, economic, and military resources there. And the Trump Administration also recognized the Indo-Pacific as the world’s center of gravity.” (Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, The White House, February 2022, p. 4; hereinafter cited as IPS)
The Indo-Pacific: An exclusive asset of the USA ...
What appears to be a list of facts that American governments have “recognized” essentially presents a claim they insist on with all their might. This claim concerns America’s unique status in this region: the fact that it has transformed this capitalistically vibrant area into a rich source of capitalist wealth for America includes its right to a scale and quality of security that makes the reference to the Second World War entirely appropriate. In its Indo-Pacific home region, America still needs the security of a world war-level victorious power; a power that knows the other states in the region are staunchly allied, reliably integrated members of a capitalist order in which America is and remains the undisputed model and the unchallenged, dominant superpower. The assurance about how much the USA belongs to this region stands in this sense for the reverse clarification about how much this region belongs to the USA – as its asset, without which it cannot be a world power, which is the only way it considers itself capable of existing. In this spirit, the new US Secretary of Defense proclaims the good news that the second Trump administration is clearly following in the footsteps of its predecessors, at least in this respect:
“America is proud to be back in the Indo-Pacific — and we're here to stay. The United States is an Indo-Pacific nation. We have been since the earliest days of our Republic. We will continue to be an Indo-Pacific nation — with Indo-Pacific interests — for generations to come.” (US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, speech at the Shangri-La Security Conference in Singapore, May 31, 2025)
The American ruling class is therefore united and determined in its insistence that successful exploitation of the Indo-Pacific region for the wealth and power of the USA requires successful domination over its political conditions and resources; hence, it needs the power to define the conditions and resources under which local rulers in turn compete for wealth and power. According to the dialectic of capitalist exploitation and imperialist oversight demonstrated by the American strategy, the guaranteed, universal recognition of the superiority of American power is the indispensable foundation for free and peaceful trade, hence the absolute goal of American military strategy.
... increasingly contested by China
The main addressee of this strategy is well known:
“This intensifying American focus is due in part to the fact that the Indo-Pacific faces mounting challenges, particularly from the PRC. The PRC is combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world’s most influential power. The PRC’s coercion and aggression spans the globe, but it is most acute in the Indo-Pacific. From the economic coercion of Australia to the conflict along the Line of Actual Control with India to the growing pressure on Taiwan and bullying of neighbors in the East and South China Seas, our allies and partners in the region bear much of the cost of the PRC’s harmful behavior. In the process, the PRC is also undermining human rights and international law, including freedom of navigation, as well as other principles that have brought stability and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific.” (IPS, p. 5)
What qualifies the People’s Republic as an intolerable “challenge” is its willingness and ability to convert its economic and technological rise into diplomatic and military power, which it explicitly does not see or use as a powerful contribution to an order defined and defended primarily by the USA. With the dependencies of the states in this region on China, which it has fostered with its booming capitalism, and with the means of coercion that it is accumulating to shape and control its surroundings, it exerts a “harmful” influence on the Pacific states, which America directly relates to itself as a challenge to its supremacy in the region:
“The PRC is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.” (National Security Strategy, The White House, October 2022, p. 23; hereinafter cited as NSS)
“China seeks to become a hegemonic power in Asia. No doubt. It hopes to dominate and control too many parts of this vibrant and vital region. Through its massive military build-up and growing willingness to use military force to achieve its goals, including grey zone tactics and hybrid warfare, China has demonstrated that it wants to fundamentally alter the region's status quo.” (Shangri-La speech by Hegseth, op. cit.)
The People’s Republic’s military build-up and resulting potential to dominate its neighbors are therefore the decisive indicators for US leaders of a Chinese attack on the American overlords. And that is indeed the imperialist state of affairs: China’s declared ambition to become a world power on an equal rank that sets its own standards for success and insists on its sovereignty and recognition of its interests is unwilling to accept America as the superior order-keeping power that assigns all other countries in the region, and China in particular, the status of free, peacefully subordinate participants in an American-defined and dominated order. For its part, China insists that its vital interests justify a right to security through its superiority as an order-keeping power. In contrast, the US advocates the offensive defense of the status quo – a nice expression for a successfully clarified, universally recognized and accepted power relation. It insists that the “international order” recognizes and tolerates only one global economy, hence only one authority that supervises intergovernmental relations of dependence and extortion. The US is the ‘rule-maker’ of this order – China is the ‘rule-taker’ and must remain so.[1] Of course, the American world power also knows how to add a moral dimension to its enmity against China: the enemy image of an aggressive, malicious rival that breaks the law and wants to conquer Asia by force.
The answer of the USA: peace through strength
US leadership is clear on how to deal with China’s attack on America’s asset: security through deterrence!
“We do not seek to dominate or strangle China. To encircle or provoke. We do not seek regime change, nor will we instigate or disrespect a proud and historic culture. We will be ready, but we will not be reckless. Instead, we seek peace. But we must ensure that China cannot dominate us – or our allies and partners. Maintaining the status quo requires strength. That’s just a rational, common sense goal that all should be able to live with. President Trump has also said that Communist China will not invade Taiwan on his watch. So, our goal is to prevent war, to make the costs too high, and peace the only option. And we will do this with a strong shield of deterrence, forged together with you – America’s great allies and defense partners. Together, we will show what it means to execute peace through strength. In many ways seen and unseen. Overt and covert... That is re-establishing deterrence....But if deterrence fails, and if called upon by my Commander in Chief, we are prepared to do what the Department of Defense does best – fight and win – decisively.” (Shangri-La speech by Hegseth, op. cit.)
The diplomatic denial of any intrusive machinations will quite rightly be interpreted by the Chinese leaders in light of the plain American language on the announced strategic confrontation. They are supposed to be intimidated by the American determination to defend the status quo in the Indo-Pacific with a policy of deterrence. The person responsible for the “strongest and deadliest armed forces in the world” confronts his Chinese counterparts with the superiority of his own weapons and the irreversible decision to never avoid war – it can only be avoided by China recognizing its own inferiority and deciding “it’s not worth it.”[2] The ability and willingness of the USA to fight and win – what its own military “does best” – should therefore make military action against China’s claims superfluous. With its policy of deterrence, the American world power is taking the offensive standpoint of achieving the outcome of war – securing the Indo-Pacific as an undisputed US asset, i.e., setting its Chinese rival in a permanent status of inferiority – without war. This is the political substance of the “peace through strength” proclaimed by the Trump administration.
On the one hand, the announcement of the need to restore deterrence is not without irony, as if this nation, with its huge defense budget and its vastly superior armed forces, with its military buildups, troop deployments, and strategic planning has been carelessly neglecting deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. On the other hand, the USA is documenting how self-centered it is in its attitude toward the rise of Chinese power: obviously, deterrence was not deterrent enough, which is what encouraged the People’s Republic to pursue the ambitious rivalry that America is now suffering under. The self-criticism of having made China a rival in the first place indicates the long overdue need for correction: the Trump administration must and will undo the unforgivable mistakes of previous administrations by mobilizing the USA’s incomparable wealth and power in order to place China under an absolutely credible, deterrent threat of world war.
The strategic mission: transforming the Indo-Pacific into a theater of war that guarantees victory in a military showdown
For American military power, this means that the strategic mission is to comprehensively ensure and perfect deterrence of the enemy. In its National Security Strategy, the USA has committed itself to the concept of integrated deterrence and defined the areas that need to be taken into account, planned, and optimized for this purpose:
“Our National Defense Strategy relies on integrated deterrence: the seamless combination of capabilities to convince potential adversaries that the costs of their hostile activities outweigh their benefits. It entails:
—Integration across domains, recognizing that our competitors’ strategies operate across military (land, air, maritime, cyber, and space) and non-military (economic, technological, and information) domains—and we must too.
—Integration across regions, understanding that our competitors combine expansive ambitions with growing capabilities to threaten U.S. interests in key regions and in the homeland.
—Integration across the spectrum of conflict to prevent competitors from altering the status quo in ways that harm our vital interests while hovering below the threshold of armed conflict.
—Integration across the U.S. Government to leverage the full array of American advantages, from diplomacy, intelligence, and economic tools to security assistance and force posture decisions. Integration with allies and partners through investments in interoperability and joint capability development, cooperative posture planning, and coordinated diplomatic and economic approaches.
Integrated deterrence requires us to more effectively coordinate, network, and innovate so that any competitor thinking about pressing for advantage in one domain understands that we can respond in many others as well. This augments the traditional backstop of combat-credible conventional and strategic capabilities, allowing us to better shape adversary perceptions of risks and costs of action against core U.S. interests, at any time and across any domain.” (NSS, p. 22)With its military doctrine, the US commits itself to supplementing its “traditional” deterrence with superior armed forces in the five domains decisive for warfare by using all the potential of its civilian transportation system as a weapon to harm the enemy. National and international business, science and technology, the internet and information, allies and partners in all regions of the globe are being “integrated” – for the purpose of confronting the enemy with a seamless continuum of force. The aim is to make the enemy “perceive” nothing but certain defeat even before any war begins, and to deter it from taking up arms.
For US military strategists, this presents the challenge of concentrating their expertise in warfare, their planning efforts, and their control over the nation’s military resources on “traditional security” and preparing the Indo-Pacific, with its seas, islands, and landmasses, into a theater of war – in accordance with the guideline of ensuring the superiority of their own military power, including that of their allies, in every conceivable scenario and at every level of military escalation, from conventional warfare with marines to the use of nuclear weapons, which must not spiral into a self-destructive exchange of blows. The latter poses a very special type of challenge for the American world power.
The main strategic issue: planning a war against a nuclear power
The Chinese rival is a rising nuclear power, albeit one with weapons that are significantly inferior in terms of quality and quantity. The US is confronted with the fact that a war with the People’s Republic would involve the possibility of escalating into a nuclear war – and thus risks the destruction of its homeland. The Indo-Pacific region, as an arena for military combat against Chinese military power, is therefore gaining a significance that extends far beyond the preservation of the political and strategic status quo in the region:
“The PLA’s expanding nuclear force will enable it to target more U.S. cities, military facilities, and leadership sites than ever before in a potential a nuclear conflict. While PRC leaders have historically judged that being able to inflict even limited damage during a nuclear counterstrike was sufficient for deterrence—an “assured retaliation” capability—the PRC’s force modernization suggests that it seeks to have the ability to inflict far greater levels of overwhelming damage to an adversary in a nuclear exchange as well as engage in multiple rounds of counterstrike, including through more discriminate forms of nuclear employment, such as with lower-yield weapons.” (Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2024, p. 102)
The US has noticed advances in China's nuclear arms, with leading experts in this field recognizing a qualitative shift in China's nuclear war strategy. If this trend continues, its strategy will no longer be limited to inflicting massive but ultimately limited damage on the enemy through a nuclear counterstrike; that is, to a “retaliatory capability” which, although it must be taken seriously and gives the country the special status of a nuclear deterrent power – in China’s case, connected with membership in the exclusive club of recognized nuclear powers and the UN Security Council – it does not yet cause America’s strategists any significant concern. They perceive China’s advances in nuclear arms as having the intention of replacing its doctrine of “minimal deterrence,” based on a limited number of massive nuclear strikes, with the ability to wage nuclear war at the sophisticated level of first and second strikes,[3] with multiple flexible responses and the escalating use of a differentiated spectrum of nuclear weapons. To date, only the American – and the ex-Soviet Russian – nuclear powers possess such a capability, and it is imperative that this remains the case.[4]
The US therefore feels compelled to neutralize the threat it anticipates: the threat to its security not only from the “limited damage” that the use of individual Chinese “weapons of mass destruction” would cause, but also from the enemy’s capability of launching “multiple counterattacks,” including with specially designed nuclear weapons, against specific targets – presumably those of particular military importance. What the US is demanding of itself is a combination of a more reliable defense against a whole swarm of nuclear offensive weapons with a reliable prevention against their use; this is necessary to ensure that its deterrent power is guaranteed to be unilaterally effective precisely where it must assume that China will be capable of serious counter-deterrence at the elevated level of a nuclear exchange. In the near future, an impenetrable missile defense system called “Golden Dome” is to protect North American soil from the destructive power of Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles. It is intended to render ineffective any first strike by China as well as – in the event of an American first strike – an escalating response with a whole series of Chinese second strikes; at the same time, the USA’s own offensive weapons are being sharpened, increased, and secured in such a way that the enemy has no chance of defense against them.
For America, it’s all a question of money, so no question:
“‘This budget [the Trump administration’s largest-ever defense spending bill of one trillion dollars for the coming fiscal year [5]] invests $25 billion in Golden Dome for America, a down payment on President Trump's priority to defend our homeland,’ he [Hegseth] said. ‘It also commits more than $62 billion in total to modernize and sustain our nuclear forces as we face rising nuclear dangers.’ Hegseth told senators that the nuclear triad is the centerpiece of U.S. deterrence, and the recapitalization of it involves new submarines, such as the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines; new intercontinental ballistic missiles as part of the Sentinel program; and bomber aircraft, such as the B-21 Raider. ‘No doubt, our nuclear triad is the silent foundation of our entire deterrent effect, and that's why this budget fully funds all three legs of the triad and makes sure we're leaning forward and ensuring we have the most capable nuclear deterrent possible,’ he said.” (US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth before Congress, June 11, 2025, quoted from afnwc.af.mil)
The expansion of nuclear defense is entirely in the service of offense. By modernizing its interceptor weapons and nuclear triad, with which the destructive power, accuracy, and invulnerability of its nuclear forces on land, at sea, and in the air is optimized, thus securing the superiority of its own destructive power,[6] America is putting itself in a position to calculate (more) freely with nuclear war; in the long term, even a disarming strike against the Chinese nuclear arsenal is within the realm of possibility. In this way, the USA is making remarkable progress for its part: not only for its “Golden Dome,” but also for the preventive elimination of China’s strategic arsenal, it is arming itself with powerful non-nuclear precision weapons, the use of which, according to the wonderful logic of a nuclear exchange of blows in warfare, would not mark the gambit of nuclear escalation, but would at once – thanks primarily to their quantity and distribution in the Indo-Pacific region – ideally have the same effect as a nuclear disarmament strike. The new “forward-deployed” intermediate-range and cruise missiles, with their drastically reduced warning times, can be used both against conventional military targets and to destroy the People’s Liberation Army's land-based nuclear missiles and nuclear command structures: “In terms of their strategic impact, they are equivalent to a nuclear strike.”
Of course, this is exactly how the Chinese side sees it:
“China deplores US dominance in offensive and defensive non-nuclear systems, which would undermine its nuclear second-strike capability. From China’s perspective, thousands of Tomahawks and air-to-surface missiles (especially JASSM-ER) belonging to the US and its allies in the region could be used against its own launch and control systems in a moment of crisis. Surviving missiles would then have to overcome US missile defense systems, which are to be further expanded in the region and around the US itself. This concern is exacerbated by the expansion of military capabilities in many of China’s neighboring countries... More and more countries in the region are seeking to conclude security agreements with the US and to station or purchase state-of-the-art American weapons systems on their territory.” (internationalepolitik.de, February 24, 2025)
In China’s “concerns” and corresponding arms build-up, American strategists see the danger that the enemy could, in an emergency, contrary to its official renunciation of a nuclear first strike – “no first use policy” – decide to use its nuclear weapons first, not only in response to a nuclear first strike by the US, before its arsenal, intended as a deterrent, is destroyed by America’s “conventional” superweapons:
“Despite publicizing this policy, the PRC’s nuclear strategy probably includes consideration of a nuclear first strike in response to nonnuclear attacks that PRC leaders perceive as threatening the viability of the PRC’s nuclear forces or C2, or that approximate the strategic effects of a nuclear strike. Beijing probably would consider nuclear first use if a conventional military defeat in Taiwan gravely threatened CCP regime survival.” (Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, op. cit., p. 102)
For the US, the first consequence of this is a decisive “Keep it up!” And to such an extent – Hegseth’s speech to Congress speaks for itself – that even the Trump administration feels compelled to engage in a diplomacy that, in form, aims at reaching an understanding. What is being offered is a mutual renunciation of further proliferation of nuclear weapons – “common-sense politics” à la Trump:
“Responding by video to a reporter’s question about the U.S.-China relationship at the World Economic Forum Jan. 23 at Davos, Trump said ‘we want to see if we can denuclearize, and I think that’s very possible.’ He reiterated this position later that day during an interview at the White House with Fox News. ‘I want to say: Let’s cut our military budget in half,’ Trump told reporters on Feb. 14, on the prospect of a trilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping. ‘There’s no reason for us to be building brand-new nuclear weapons; we already have so many,’ he added...” (Trump Says U.S. Is Open to Nuclear Talks, armscontrol.org)
Such a deal, intended to mutually avert further nuclear arms races, would solidify the balance of power between America’s comprehensive strategic military might and China’s hitherto underdeveloped second-strike capabilities, thus establishing the desired unilateral deterrence. The fact that the Chinese side is not receptive to this –
“Four days later at a press conference in Beijing, Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun reiterated China’s traditional position that Russia and the United States should ‘further make drastic and substantive cuts to their nuclear arsenals, and create necessary conditions for other nuclear-weapon states to join in the nuclear disarmament process.’” (ibid.)[7] –
is responded to by the US president in his typically honest way: “Stubborn!” What he would like to see is the recognition of American superiority as a premise of Chinese defense policy – and that is, of course, out of the question for Beijing. The continued invitation to arms control negotiations, however, at least confirms the sustained interest of US diplomacy, which is very experienced in this matter, in ensuring that “transparency” is established through an agreement on mutual arms developments, so that the PRC remains aware of America’s absolute superiority and relentlessly maintained readiness for war and no longer sees this as a good reason to catch up on its nuclear arsenal, but rather realizes that an offensive response to America’s superiority is neither necessary to maintain the nation’s status nor could be worthwhile for gaining strategic status.
On balance, the US remains faced with the self-imposed task of credibly deterring not just one, but three nuclear powers in the Indo-Pacific – two large and one small – without allowing itself to be deterred by anything.[8]
The preparation of a conventional “theater of war”: operating rooms, bases, and means of warfare for escalation dominance in all conceivable scenarios
Superior nuclear deterrence does not spare America anything – not a single soldier, not a single artillery piece, and not a single fighter jet. On the contrary: in order to fulfill its purpose of securing the USA’s freedom to wage war, it presupposes and even demands a capacity for military escalation in every field of conventional warfare that makes it clear to the enemy at every level of conflict that there is no hope of gaining an advantage – from a skirmish over some reef in the South China Sea across all scenarios to an exchange of blows with conventional missiles of strategic quality.[9] As much as its own nuclear deterrent arsenal always has the option of inflicting a devastating blow on the PRC, there is just as much need for a comprehensive conventional “superiority” that not only dominates the battlefield below the “nuclear threshold,” but is also capable of eliminating key Chinese sources of power and, even in the event of an enemy nuclear strike, provides the option of responding to it with a massive non-nuclear counterstrike. For the US, deterrence of the enemy is only “credible,” i.e., overwhelmingly effective, if American superiority and freedom of calculation – in the language of strategists: its absolute escalation dominance – is guaranteed at every level of a ladder of war scenario defined autonomously by the USA.
For this strategic purpose, American war planners are preparing their geopolitical assets – practically the entire Pacific region, including its vast sea areas – into a perfect “theater of war.” The merging of the two oceans, the Indian and the Pacific, into a single “free and open Indo-Pacific” is a construct devised by US strategists, based on their position of offensively securing the claimed sphere of influence exclusively under American control. It defines the geographical area functionally, namely as its own staging area, in order to surround the “Middle Kingdom” with materialized threats of war in the form of an omnipresent American military force.
Military strategy therefore views the entire Indian and Pacific Ocean region solely as a – positive or negative – condition and object of successful warfare, effectively subsuming it under this judgment: no tropical island is too idyllic for American military power not to be converted into a Marine garrison or Air Force base; no coral reef is too colorful not to be blown up as an obstacle to Navy ships and their “freedom of navigation”; no island is too industrialized and populated not to be planned with as a frontline state in the war with China. The US military assigns all island states in the world’s largest ocean to different island chains, which are defined qualitatively solely by their distance from China and their military function in the anticipated war scenario. Essentially, American strategy recognizes three island chains.[10]
The first chain of islands perfectly separates the South and East China Seas from the rest of the Western Pacific. American naval power and its allies have seamless control over the straits, as well as over the islands allied with the US or neutral states (Malaysia and Indonesia); China does not have a single base or ally there. The first strategic objective in the event of conflict and war in the South China Sea is to pen in the People’s Liberation Army Navy and the air force supporting it – and to destroy them. At the same time, China’s naval and air force units operating in the open Pacific is to be prevented from returning to their home ports; they are to be cut off from support and supplies and their operational capabilities severely restricted. The blockade will be particularly effective because the first two of China's three aircraft carriers are diesel-powered and will quickly reach their operational limits without fuel supplies. Coastal Taiwan will further seal off China’s internal shipping lanes, while control of the straits will block China’s transportation and supply routes and cause major problems for Chinese nuclear submarines, which are an essential part of China’s second-strike capability, on their way to the depths of the Pacific. The great strategic advantage that the US enjoys by controlling the first island chain was gleefully described by Navy representatives more than a decade ago with their characteristic arrogance:
“Want to give China an ulcer, a nagging sore that compels Beijing to think twice about aggression? Then look at the map. Geography affords the U.S.-Japan alliance abundant opportunities to make trouble for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), denying China’s military access to the vast maneuver space of the Western Pacific while hampering its movements up and down the Asian seaboard. Fortifying the offshore island chain while deploying naval assets in adjoining waters could yield major strategic gains on the cheap. Doing so is common sense. The only question is how... The chain would present a formidable barrier to exit from or entry into the China Seas. This is an ideal opportunity for mischief-making at the PLA Navy’s expense. Contingents scattered on and around the islands and straits comprising the first island chain could give Beijing a bad day should things turn grim over the Senkaku Islands, Taiwan, or some other geopolitical controversy.” (US Naval Institute, Defend the First Island Chain, usni.org, April 2014)
The second island chain, with the main American base on Guam, serves to protect the islands of the first chain, which form the main battle line with their naval, air force, and missile bases. Supplies are to be secured from the east (Hawaii, the American west coast) and south (Australia). The freedom of operation and transport security required for this throughout the western Pacific will be provided by the third island chain in the large triangle formed by Hawaii, Japan, and Australia. It goes without saying that the functionality of these island chains requires American supremacy over the entire Pacific island world of small states, which must not grant China any political influence, let alone bases.
With its island chain system, the US will force the People’s Liberation Army on the defensive right from the start of any armed conflict. America is fighting the emerging military power, which is itself fighting for control of its coastal seas with its “Area Access/Area Denial” (A2/AD)[11] strategy, from the standpoint of its established position of firmly entrenched military supremacy over the Pacific, which borders China.[12] The American world power is thus defending its status at the very forefront – “forward posture” in the jargon of strategists – and expanding it, while China finds itself forced to aggressively assert its interest in changing the military balance of power on the ground from the position of a constrained power. This makes China the “aggressor” – not only in an ideological sense, but also in terms of a real military disadvantage vis-à-vis the real master of land, sea, and air.
The Indo-Pacific is primarily a vast maritime area. Accordingly, naval warfare plays a prominent, dual role in victory and defeat in the designated “theater of war.” Defensively, the Navy has the task of securing the maritime regions against incursions and breakout attempts, as well as defending the island chains against occupation attempts by the Chinese Navy. Offensively, it is meant to attack the Chinese mainland and its strategic inventory with its missile cruisers and aircraft carriers. The latter is also the task of the Air Force: to combat the Chinese navy and destroy targets in China itself from island bases with its overwhelming number of fighter jets, long-range bombers, short- and medium-range missiles, and cruise missiles.
The USA sees itself challenged by the People’s Republic’s naval build-up to defend its undisputed dominance of the seas since World War II: by restructuring its global naval forces, concentrating them in the Indo-Pacific, and accelerating an arms build-up that secures and expands the US Navy’s lead. US military planners are paying particular attention to “mobility,” i.e., the flexible deployability of all possible offensive and defensive, reconnaissance and landing, escort and patrol missions; on speed and firepower for combined warfare using all the high-tech components that are indispensable for modern warfare; and, in particular, on expanding the fleet with unmanned “vehicles” that can operate both on and below the water’s surface. The main component for projecting superior maritime power continues to be aircraft carrier battle groups, of which at least two, and if necessary five or six, are stationed in the Indo-Pacific, each with around 30 escort ships, ranging from missile cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and minelayers to conventional and nuclear-powered submarines.
The latter play a special role in the maritime encirclement and threat to China. Nuclear-armed submarines (Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear – SSBN) are a strategic component of the nuclear triad and the most survivable system for nuclear first and second strikes. The US is mobilizing its military-industrial complex to modernize its strategic submarine fleet in order to replace the active Ohio-class with the new, much more difficult to detect and track Columbia generation (planned for 2031) in the coming years. A combination of nuclear-powered submarines and conventional arms constitute the SSN (Ship Submersible Nuclear), also known as attack submarines. With their diving capabilities, the practical impossibility for the enemy to detect and engage them, and with their arms (against enemy nuclear missile submarines, aircraft carriers, and other large warships, as well as against land targets deep inland: within a range of 2,500 km for their Tomahawk cruise missiles), they make a strategic impact. In particular, the US Navy’s SSNs are capable of attacking Chinese nuclear-powered missile submarines and thus China’s nuclear second-strike capability. This destructive potential makes the attack submarines a crucial strategic asset for the US. [13] With 57 boats of this type (compared to 9 Chinese), superior technology, range, and arms (approx. 90 Tomahawk cruise missiles per boat), they form a key part of the strategic threat to China. Together with the 14 submarines that carry ballistic missiles (20 missiles per submarine, each with 4–5 nuclear warheads) and operate mainly in the Indo-Pacific, the Americans have a nuclear destructive and deterrent potential that gives them an arms advantage of 20 years.[14]
The US is responding to the declared intention and growing capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army to challenge the existing balance of power in the Indo-Pacific with a re-armament and modernization program covering all aspects of modern warfare, designed for every conceivable scenario. This is an open-ended task, as the US measures the quality and quantity of its weapons solely in terms of its insatiable demand. This is determined by nothing but the unconditional will of the American world power to leave its rivals no chance, now or in the future, no matter how much they may arm themselves.
US military planners attribute an increasingly important contribution to the superiority of the Navy, Air Force, and Army on the battlefields of the future to space reconnaissance and the processing of information by artificial intelligence. Both have the highest priority on their to-do list:
“To maintain credible deterrence and, if necessary, prevail in conflict, USINDOPACOM requires sustained investment in the capabilities outlined below... Modern warfare demands superior information systems that can function effectively in highly contested environments to enable a decision-making advantage. Advanced AI and machine learning systems play a critical role in this effort. These AI systems already enhance fidelity and speed, allowing our personnel to focus on complex decision-making that requires human judgment. Inside the headquarters, AI-enabled tools reduce the time required for mission planning from days to hours … Space superiority is essential to our operations across all domains. U.S. adversaries are rapidly developing sophisticated counter-space capabilities, including direct-ascent anti satellite weapons, co-orbital threats, and advanced jamming systems. To maintain our competitive advantage, USINDOPACOM and USSPACECOM require resilient space based systems that operate through contested domains without capability degradation. This includes enhanced space domain awareness systems, combat credible defensive counter-space systems, and rapidly deployable satellite constellations that provide redundancy and complicate adversary targeting. U.S. space architecture must continue to proliferate smaller, distributed systems that provide redundancy and complicate adversary targeting.” (Admiral Samuel J. Paparo, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Posture, armedservices.house.gov, April 2025)
The US secures its military dominance in space through its ability to disable enemy satellites and protect its own from destruction, and through redundancy in its systems, which can never be too great. Luck in war should no longer play a role, and a surprise attack by the enemy like the one on Pearl Harbor in the last Pacific War should be definitively ruled out. With the ability to conduct seamless reconnaissance and to disable the enemy’s reconnaissance capabilities, as well as the fastest possible AI-based processing of this “intelligence,” the US gains a “cutting edge” in command and control of the battle field.
The US Secretary of Defense defines the Pentagon’s priorities for the coming years programmatically:
“That is re-establishing deterrence. So, we're doing this here in the Indo-Pacific in three distinct ways, and forgive me as I go into a little bit of detail: First, by improving our forward force posture, second, by helping allies and partners strengthen their defense capabilities, and third by rebuilding defense industrial bases.
So first, the Department of Defense is prioritizing forward-postured, combat credible forces in the Western Pacific to deter by denial along the first and second island chains. In my first trip to the Indo-Pacific in March, I traveled to the Philippines to meet with President Marcos and Secretary of National Defense Teodoro. While there we announced our commitment to deploy more advanced U.S. military capabilities to the Philippines. We announced the inaugural overseas deployment of NMESIS, a U.S. Marine Corps mobile anti-ship missile system, to the Philippines. The 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment – one of the U.S. military's most capable and lethal formations – exercised NMESIS along with our Philippine allies. Together we deployed the system to the Batanes Islands on the Luzon Strait between the Philippines and Taiwan...And, this summer, the U.S. Army has plans to conduct its first live-fire test of its Mid-Range Capability system in Australia. This will be the first time that system is fired west of the International Date Line, the first time it's been tested on foreign soil...And third, we are revitalizing our defense industrial bases and reallocating resources toward the most lethal and effective capabilities. We are doing this because success of the warfighters requires it. It's one thing for an adversary to see multinational forces operating together in exercises. It's another thing entirely for that same country to see an integrated defense industrial base supporting those forces and standing ready to keep them in the fight... We'll also use our allies' world-class ship repair capabilities to enhance the U.S. Navy's operational effectiveness...Within the Quad we are also leading an initiative called the Indo-Pacific Logistics Network, enabling Quad partners [Australia, India, Japan, USA] to leverage shared logistics capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. You know, they say, rookies talk strategy, pros talk logistics...We're deepening our cooperation with Australia's Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance enterprise with historic momentum and purpose. This work secures our technological edge and makes our munitions supply chains resilient.” (Shangri-La speech by Hegseth, ibid.)“Forward posture,” military alliances, armed forces interoperability, resilience in the event of war through perfect supply chains and local repair capacities – all of these are functional components for creating a unilateral war scenario that “restores” deterrence because it guarantees dominance at every stage of military escalation.
Allies and defense networks: America’s “greatest asymmetric advantage”
In preparing the Indo-Pacific theater of war and encircling China with an overwhelming arsenal of weapons and soldiers, the US is exploiting its unique status in the region. The world of states that surrounds the “Middle Kingdom” from the sea has been completely taken over in terms of security policy and military power as America’s asset. And not only in the sense that the victorious power of World War II in the Pacific has over 60 major military bases in these states.[15] It has exclusively assigned the states of the Indo-Pacific – from large and powerful ones such as Japan and Australia to small but nevertheless important ones such as the Marshall Islands or the Federated States of Micronesia – as its military allies. America is not a “lone hegemon,” as China would like to see it, but a Pacific power with a phalanx of allies that amplify its power.
“Consistent with our broader strategic approach, we will prioritize our single greatest asymmetric strength: our network of security alliances and partnerships. Across the region, the United States will work with allies and partners to deepen our interoperability and develop and deploy advanced warfighting capabilities as we support them in defending their citizens and their sovereign interests.” (IPS, p. 12)
This alliance system defines the security policy identity of all these powers. Even before any effective conflict with China, it is clear which side they are on. The security and defense treaties between the US and its partners commit them to mutual assistance in the event of conflict and war. When this will occur is, of course, ultimately decided by the American world power. The allies have committed themselves to the strategic service of being functional components of the military encirclement and deterrence of China. The US defends this subsumption with its promise to guarantee the security of its Indo-Pacific allies. The protection of their sovereignty and freedom coincides with the defense of American sovereignty over the Indo-Pacific – and vice versa.
Because it is about this, the US Secretary of Defense does not hide his dissatisfaction with the way many of his Indo-Pacific allies are dealing with the Chinese threat.
“Facing these threats, we know that many countries are tempted by the idea of seeking both economic cooperation with China and defense cooperation with the United States. Now that is a geographic necessity for many. But beware the leverage that the CCP seeks with that entanglement. Economic dependence on China only deepens their malign influence and complicates our defense decision space during times of tension.” (Shangri-La speech by Hegseth, op. cit.)
The US government is, of course, aware of its allies’ own, sometimes conflicting, national calculations regarding China’s economic power. Political disputes with China do not prevent them from profiting from the booming Chinese capitalism through trade and capital imports and exports. The fact that more and more business relationships are creating mutual benefits, but at the same time more and more dependencies, which China uses as instruments of political extortion, is a nuisance that the US is no longer willing or able to tolerate. From the standpoint of forming an absolutely reliable front under American leadership, the economic relationships of the allies with their Chinese rival are nothing short of dangerous. Containing and deterring the People’s Republic requires that the allies commit themselves without exception and unconditionally to this strategic goal, that is, that they use their economic relations as leverage to damage China. They should put the wealth of their nations entirely at the service of the joint arms buildup.
“As we shift our focus to this region, and as Europe steps up and takes greater ownership for its own security, President Trump and I will be counting on you, on this room – our allies and partners – to be force multipliers for peace alongside the United States. We ask — and indeed, we insist — that our allies and partners do their part on defense. Sometimes, that means having uncomfortable and tough conversations. Partners owe to it to each other to be honest and to be realistic...But you will also see that we are — and will remain — loyal to our allies and partners. The military-to-military relationship between many of our countries goes back decades, and in some cases, centuries. In fact, the only way to ensure lasting alliances and partnerships is to make sure that each side does its part and sees the benefit... I urge all our allies and partners to seize this moment with us. Our defense spending must reflect the dangers and threats that we face today.” (Shangri-La-Rede Hegseth, ibid.)
From now on, the agenda defined by the Trump administration applies: everyone must make their fair contribution to “restoring deterrence” in their region. Of course, the American commitment to straining national budgets for ever more military weapons of destruction is in the best interests of its partners. Given the threatening situation, this is only “realistic,” just “common sense.”
This ally and that ally
Even if everyone has to rearm themselves equally – the contributions that the US demands from its respective allies and the roles it envisions for them in the Indo-Pacific theater of war are quite different.
Taiwan: Object of dispute, cause of war, theater of warTaiwan – an island with a thriving capitalism, a population of around 24 million, and a central geostrategic location off the coast of mainland China, recognized as an independent, sovereign state under international law by only a handful of insignificant nations – is the object of irreconcilable imperialist claims by the two protagonists. The People’s Republic wants to unite with the island republic, invoking its historically guaranteed right and the “One China Principle” that is contractually conceded even by the US. It declares its unwavering will to achieve “reunification” – peacefully, if possible, by force, if necessary – as well as its firm determination not to postpone the resolution of this crucial national issue any longer. For the strategic takeover of the island republic is the decisive factor for its rise to a power on par with America. The USA, since the end of the Chinese civil war, has guaranteed the existence and de facto independence of the island republic, politically and militarily, with loans and weapons, but above all with the powerful reservation that, although it formally grants the People’s Republic right to reunification, effectively denies it with the decisive condition of “peaceful.”[16] For the world power, the validity of its prohibition of force will be decided in Taiwan, namely whether China will continue to be compelled by the mobilized deterrent power to respect the American decree in the future – or whether it will decide to conquer the island republic by force, which it is threatening to do with increasing vehemence.
Both sides expect their irreconcilable legal claims to escalate into war. The US is prepared for this:
“It has to be clear to all that Beijing is credibly preparing to potentially use military force to alter the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. We know. It’s public that Xi has ordered his military to be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027. The PLA is building the military needed to do it....Again, to be clear: any attempt by Communist China to conquer Taiwan by force would result in devastating consequences ...” (Shangri-La speech Hegseth, ibid.)
Taiwan itself must bear primary responsibility for ensuring that the consequences for China on the battlefield are devastating. Its army has been equipped, trained, and instructed by the American protective power for the task of repelling an invasion. The island republic is supposed to be as indigestible for mainland China as a porcupine – a nice image used by strategists to describe the (self-)destructive performance they expect from the object of their protection.
“A porcupine strategy would enhance deterrence, in that a Taipei truly prepared to defend itself would be able to thwart a decapitation attempt ... Perhaps most important, such a policy would allow the United States time to deliberate whether intervention was warranted.” (William J. Murray, US Naval War College, 2008)
Of course, a defensive war also requires many more weapons.[17] The US supplies them, Taiwan must buy them; after all, its capitalism produces an abundance of wealth which America can justifiably tap into by imposing tariffs on Taiwanese exports. But it is not only military hardware that is needed for the planned protracted war of attrition; there can never be enough human cannon fodder either. At the urging of the US, Taiwan has agreed to further increase its already substantial number of reservists.[18]
The US Secretary of Defense and his strategists are realists. Without military assistance from the American military, the island republic will hardly be able to win the defensive battle against the superior People’s Liberation Army. Without explicitly abandoning the “ambiguity” practiced by all previous administrations in the event of a Chinese invasion, which allows the world power to reserve the freedom to decide whether to go to war, the Trump administration is already committed to mobilizing its military forces stationed in the Indo-Pacific in support of Taiwan's defense –
“The new Pentagon guidance for a ‘denial defense’ of Taiwan includes increasing the troop presence through submarines, bombers, unmanned ships, specialty units from the Army and Marine Corps, and a greater focus on bombs that destroy reinforced and subterranean targets. The plan also calls for improving defense of U.S. troop locations in the Indo-Pacific, generating pre-positioned stocks and improving logistics” (Secret Memo on China, The Washington Post, March 29, 2025) –
and has sent a request to its two major allies, Australia and Japan, asking which of them would be prepared to defend Taiwan in the event of war.[19] They were not to expected to be enthusiastic about it. However, no refusals have been reported.
Japan: a powerful building block in the deterrence frontDue to its geostrategic location, the power of its capitalism, and the strength of its “self-defense forces,” Japan is one of the most potent military powers in the region and the world. Despite its pacifist post-war constitution, to which the army owes its name, its military mission and area of operations have been far broader than simply preventing invasion. Accordingly, Japan is America’s most important ally in the Indo-Pacific. As the northern cornerstone of all three island chains, it closes off the East China Sea, including the Sea of Japan, from north to south. Through its island chain (Tokara, Okinawa, Miyako, Yaeyama), Japan controls the crucial sea passages through which the Chinese navy can break out of the East China Sea into the open Pacific. The Miyako Strait in particular is considered the “gateway” for China’s naval movements into the Pacific. Furthermore, Japan – in military cooperation with the Philippines and Australia – secures Taiwan and the Luzon Strait against China.[20] At the same time, given the increasingly close military cooperation between China and Russia, defending against or hindering the Russian navy’s advance southward into the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea is becoming a crucial task for Japanese naval forces. Located at the intersection of three hostile nuclear powers, Japan has the strategic responsibility of working with the US to identify and combat, both offensively and defensively, the missiles and missile bases of Russia, North Korea, and China.[21] The Japanese Navy and Air Force are involved in defending South Korea against North Korea. With its navy of around 160 ships and an air force of over 300 combat aircraft, Japan makes a significant contribution to the USA’s “enormous asymmetric advantage” in its containment of China.[22]
The modernization of the US-Japan defense agreement of 2022 is the “turning point” in Japanese. It includes a drastic rearmament with new long-range missiles and cruise missiles (Tomahawks with a range of up to 2,500 km; in-house development of a missile with a range of at least 1,000 km). Japan intends to pose a massive threat to China deep into its hinterland.[23] In return, Japan will receive American missile defense systems to neutralize the threat posed by China’s missiles. And America is strengthening its nuclear umbrella over Japan: the deployment of nuclear-capable B-52 bombers in Japan extends deterrence.
The US-Japanese alliance is institutionalized in joint command and control structures.[24] The new “Joint Force Headquarters” of the American Indo-Pacific Command at Yokota Air Base represents the most intensive form of integrating its “Self-Defense Forces” into the US buildup against China and at the same time offers Japan participation in American global power, thus granting it the status of a military power in the Indo-Pacific region alongside and in accordance with the USA.
South Korea: Securing the flank against the main enemy by deterring North KoreaThe country, whose army is one of the ten largest in the world, is primarily intended to deter and, in the event of war, defeat North Korea. In this respect, it fulfills the strategically relevant function of securing the flank for the anti-China front: it neutralizes this militarily powerful ally of China. In addition, South Korea provides strategic services by making its territory available for the stationing and freedom of operation of American troops, nuclear-capable B-52 bombers, and nuclear missile submarines, which threaten not only North Korea but also China.[25] The South Korean navy and air force units, which are all under US command in the event of war, reinforce American striking power. For the South Korean nation, this means that its protection and enforcement against the North Korean enemy and its Chinese ally cannot be achieved except by the complete subordination of its military power to the US.
The Philippines: a weak but reliable partner in a prime locationThe US has been retrofitting its “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” which has seen little use as such since the end of the East-West conflict, for the war scenario against China.
“It’s hard to imagine a fight with the PRC without being able to use bases in the Philippines.” (Retired Admiral Harry Harris, quoted in: U.S. Defense Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific, congress.gov, June 6, 2023)
With their strategic location in the first island chain, the Philippines are an obvious choice for strategists and their logistics planning. The island nation is not only located off the coast of China, but is also the immediate southern neighbor of Taiwan, the cause and scene of the war on which all planning is based. Manila has proven to be an extremely reliable partner of the US, relying on the former colonial power to secure its sovereignty since winning independence from American colonial rule.[26] The military’s orientation has not suffered even under the Duterte administration with its critical tone toward the US. Orders to suspend maneuvers with Washington have been resisted by the military, which, above a certain rank, has been trained at military academies in the US and is convinced that its country would be nothing without the USA’s protective power.
Since gaining independence, the Philippines has guaranteed the US military bases, regardless of who is in power, which the US has used to further its changing interests in Southeast Asia. The US military can station weapons and personnel at these bases at its own discretion and operate without restriction with third parties. The US is currently expanding nine bases and building four new ones in the north, opposite Taiwan.
The functionalization of the Philippines for deployment against China includes an intensification of the annual maneuvers with a new thrust against the People’s Republic, in which the Philippines’ new allies, namely Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Australia, are now also participating.[27] To ensure that the Philippine armed forces can also train with equipment suitable for their new tasks, the US is providing military aid, supplying powerful anti-ship missiles, and upgrading the island nation’s navy or equipping it with new warships for the first time.
At the suggestion of the US, the Philippines has recently invoked the 2016 Hague ruling on maritime law, which rejected China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea in its favor. The US Navy is backing the intensified confrontation with the Chinese navy.
Australia: southern cornerstone of the theater of warThe geographical size, economic power, and location of Australia at the intersection of the Pacific and Indian Oceans make it a special strategic “asset” for the US: the fifth continent serves as the “southern cornerstone” of the Western Pacific theater of war. Australia fulfills its primary and fundamental function by providing a staging area for the American military.[28]
Australia plays a crucial role in controlling the vast area roughly defined by the triangle formed by Japan, Hawaii, and Australia, both in terms of combat power, logistics, and as a base for US military operations. Given its distance of over 5,000 km from mainland China, and the fact that direct combat intervention would only be possible with long-range missiles – which Australia currently lacks – the Australian Navy is all the more vital. It is deployed to support the US Navy in the South China Sea, including the Strait of Malacca, and is also involved in cooperating with the Philippines and Japan to control the area around Taiwan – to deter a Chinese invasion – and the crucial access to the open Pacific. The same applies to the eastern Indian Ocean. There, in cooperation with the USA and, in some cases, India, China’s logistical and military operations on its southern flank and along its vital transport routes – oil supplies from the Middle East, shipping connections to Africa and Europe – are to be monitored and, if necessary, restricted and prevented.[29]
Australia is projected to play a special role in the anti-China strategy within the framework of the AUKUS alliance: Together with the United Kingdom, it is building several nuclear-powered attack submarines – to be completed in 2040 – and is expected to receive four Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines from the US in 2030. With their diving capabilities and arms – torpedoes and cruise missiles, including long-range ones – these submarines represent an enormous strategic threat against China: in the future, they are intended to target Chinese submarines equipped with nuclear missiles, thereby undermining China’s ability to launch a nuclear second strike. In addition, they threaten the aircraft carrier battle groups of the People’s Liberation Army, the main weapon in China’s claim to regional dominance in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific. The threat potential thus covers both Chinese seas and the entire coastline and extends far into the Chinese hinterland. The deployment of Australian submarines is closely linked to the US Navy, thus also strengthening America’s combat power in this area. The AUKUS pact is also a win for America in terms of the arms industry: it has been complaining for years that its shipyard capacities are not even close to meeting its own arms requirements; the construction of additional shipyards in Australia and the use of British shipyard capacities are therefore very welcome.
For several years now, the US has been stationing significant naval and air force contingents in Australia, in some cases relocating them from Guam. The fifth continent serves as a logistics and maintenance hub for American ships, submarines, and fighter jets. Thanks to its geographical location outside the range of Chinese medium-range missiles, cruise missiles, and long-range bombers, these forces are far less vulnerable in the event of war. This also applies to the B-52 long-range bombers now stationed in Australia, which are capable of carrying nuclear war weapons. Australia is thus becoming a base for nuclear attacks against China and, for this reason, is being placed under the strengthened nuclear umbrella of the US, i.e., drawn into the USA’s nuclear war calculations against China.
India: an enormously important but unwieldy partnerIndia’s geographical location, bordering China and controlling the Indian Ocean, its population of nearly 1.5 billion – the reservoir of a booming economy and a massive army – and its military capabilities as a nuclear power make it, from an American perspective, the Asian “counterweight” to China, which completes the encirclement of the “Middle Kingdom.” The fact that India’s military buildup is measured against its Chinese rival makes it particularly attractive to American strategists, who have elevated India to the status of a “major defense partner” with access to advanced US military technology. The fact that it also maintains economic and political cooperation with China, with an anti-American orientation as seen in the BRICS group and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), makes the country a challenge for the US that must be dealt with.
The Trump administration is making considerable efforts to equip the Indian armed forces, which are still mainly equipped with Russian hardware, with American weapons. This not only brings in money but also political influence, which in this case certainly yields higher returns on arms “deals.” Even more profitable in this respect is technological and industrial cooperation on arms issues.[30] This binds the partner, which insists on its “strategic autonomy,” more closely to the American world power, which pursues the same goal with joint maneuvers that it organizes bilaterally or within the framework of the Quad alliance with Australia and Japan. Thus, this strategic partnership is progressing steadily, albeit not without some contradictions.[31]
Military exercises as a permanent institution: a necessary element of active deterrence
Military exercises are common in every army, for technical reasons, for operational reasons, and for reasons of deterrence. All of these factors come into play in the maneuvers in the Indo-Pacific, which are becoming more frequent, longer in duration, and involve more and more nations. Achieving operational readiness requires constant practice.[32]
Furthermore, the system of bilateral and trilateral security and mutual assistance agreements requires military coordination in ongoing maneuvers with alliance partners – not limited to, but especially for, the navy and air force, with and without the leading power. Only in this way can a concerted striking power suitable for all theaters of war and all scenarios be guaranteed. In the sober language of strategists, this is called “interoperability.”
The interoperability that is crucial for the world power is not limited to the mere ability of allied armies to work together. By aligning and merging different communication and command chains, fire control lines and operational plans, strategic assessments and situational evaluations, etc., a unified entity is forged from the differently functioning, formally independent national armed forces. This entity functions strategically and operationally under US military leadership as an extension of the American armed forces.
This practice creates the “strongest and deadliest fighting forces in the world,” demonstrates a shared will and overwhelming ability to win, and is therefore an indispensable element in the active deterrence of China.
Footnotes
[1] This relationship has not changed as a result of the new Trump administration rejecting the diplomacy pursued by the Biden administration, according to which the US is concerned with defending the “international order.”
[2] “We will stand with you and work alongside you to deter Chinese aggression. Each day, together, creating more and more dilemmas and complications should China want to act. Should they decide to overturn the status quo. More dilemmas, more complications, more questions, more concerns, more variables, more reasons to say, ‘it’s not worth it.’” (Shangri-La speech by Hegseth, op. cit.)
Should the enemy act nonetheless, the armed forces are ready to respond: The Secretary of Defense threatens with the “motto of the first military unit I commanded: ‘If you want peace, prepare for war!’”
[3] The periodic assessment and evaluation of the status of China’s nuclear arsenal and its doctrines for using it is the task of experts at the Pentagon. In 2024, they came to the following conclusions:
“Over the next decade, the PRC probably will continue to rapidly modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces. The PLA seeks a larger and more diverse nuclear force, comprised of systems ranging from low-yield precision strike missiles to ICBMs with multi-megaton yields to provide it options at every rung of the escalation ladder.
Beijing continued its rapid nuclear expansion. DoD estimates the PRC has surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads in its stockpile as of 2024. DoD estimates that the PRC will have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels, and will continue growing its force to 2035 in line with its goal of ensuring PLA modernization is ‘basically complete’ that year, an important milestone on the road to Xi’s goal of a ‘world class’ military by 2049.
The PRC probably continues to arm solid-propellant silo fields, which consist of 320 silos across its three new silo fields. The PLA is more than doubling the size of its DF-5 liquid-silo force, which probably will have about 50 silos by the end of the effort. The large growth of the PLA silo force suggests Beijing is making progress in establishing its ‘early warning counterstrike’ posture to increase the survivability and responsiveness of these launch sites.” (Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, op. cit., p. 101 f.)
[4] During the Cold War, these two nuclear powers developed a strategy that, on the one hand, recognized the enemy’s destructive capacity as a barrier to the free use of their own relevant capabilities and, on the other hand, aimed to overcome this barrier and worked to do so with ever new inventions and types of weaponry. This absurdly precarious relationship between unilateral will to destroy and mutual recognition became the subject of arms diplomacy, through which both sides assured each other of their continued recognition, precisely because they were working on ways to overcome the barrier that the enemy’s weapons posed to their war calculations. Within the framework of this arms diplomacy, a whole world of calculated threats of destruction and corresponding arsenals has been created, which the “nuclear superpowers” – especially the stronger one – want to reserve exclusively for themselves and keep under their control.
[5] “The $961.6 billion budget put forward by the President reverses four years of mismanagement and underinvestment....This budget provides a historic level of funding for military readiness – putting our warfighters and their needs first – and young Americans are responding and signing up in droves. We are rebuilding our military; 25 years ago, our military was unchallenged, yet we squandered that advantage as China carried out an unprecedented military buildup.” (Hegseth in the same speech to Congress)
[6] The modernization of the triad includes equipping the nuclear forces with a new nuclear bomb, the development of which has already been commissioned by the Biden administration. Its destructive power can be precisely programmed to take out hardened targets such as missile silos or bunkered command centers:
“Adding more teeth to its nuclear arsenal, the Biden administration has announced that the United States plans to develop a new variant of a nuclear gravity bomb, known as the B61-13 … The NPR [Nuclear Posture Review] analysis also essentially approved the multibillion-dollar program of record for updating all main nuclear warhead types currently in use and modernizing all US nuclear weapons delivery systems. It may, thus, not wholly come as a surprise that the Pentagon is now looking at building a higher-yield nuclear bomb...For perspective, like all B61 versions, the B61-7 is a so-called ‘dial-a-yield’ design, meaning that it can be programmed to explode with different levels of explosive power. This version is one of the most potent B61 models....’The B61-13 will provide the President with additional options against certain harder and large-area military targets’... The decision to build a new high-yield bomb, thus, seems to be directly influenced by the construction of facilities taking place in rival countries that are also simultaneously bolstering the inventory of their nuclear weapons, including building underground command and control facilities in China and Russia.” (US Plans ‘Highly Destructive’ Nukes That Can Demolish Hardened Military Facilities, Eurasian Times, 10/28/23)
[7] “Yet China has stubbornly resisted further negotiations, arguing that because of the wide gap between Chinese and U.S. nuclear forces, the transparency required for nuclear diplomacy would make China too vulnerable. Only when Washington and Moscow both shrink their nuclear arsenals, China’s diplomats often say, will it be time to talk.” (Rose Gottemoeller, Arms Control Is Not Dead Yet, in: Foreign Affairs, April 15, 2025)
[8] Since the war in Ukraine, the US has been concerned about a growing “strategic partnership” between China, Russia, and North Korea:
“The White House never announced that Mr. Biden had approved the revised strategy, called the ‘Nuclear Employment Guidance,’ which also newly seeks to prepare the United States for possible coordinated nuclear challenges from China, Russia and North Korea...The new strategy, Mr. Vaddi said, emphasizes ‘the need to deter Russia, the PRC and North Korea simultaneously,’ using the acronym for the People’s Republic of China...In the past, the likelihood that American adversaries could coordinate nuclear threats to outmaneuver the American nuclear arsenal seemed remote. But the emerging partnership between Russia and China, and the conventional arms North Korea and Iran are providing to Russia for the war in Ukraine have fundamentally changed Washington’s thinking.” (Biden Approved Secret Nuclear Strategy Refocusing on Chinese Threat, New York Times, 8/20/24)
“Thus, in the near future, the United States could face two nuclear powers, Russia and China, deploying similar numbers of nuclear warheads. These two close partners could together threaten a first strike against which the United States would not have enough weapons to respond. Their combined superiority would undermine the United States’ ability to deter them, with potential catastrophic consequences for regional and global stability.” (Rose Gottemoeller, op. cit.)
[9] This quality relates to the range and targets of weapons that are directed beyond the respective battlefield against substantial military, economic, and command resources of the enemy state that are crucial to its war-fighting capabilities.
[10] The first island chain runs from Japan via Taiwan and the Philippines towards Singapore and the northern tip of Australia, the second island chain from the northern tip of Japan eastward to the south via Guam and the small island states of Palau, Micronesia, Marshall Islands to the east coast of Australia, and the third island chain from the northern tip of Japan to Hawaii and from there to the southeastern tip of Australia.
[11] China’s arms goal is therefore to enable and secure access to the maritime area for its own military forces and to deny access to enemy military forces.
[12] Put simply, this means that whoever controls Taiwan, the first island chain, controls the theater of war, and that is the US:
“The fate of Taiwan will basically determine the future of Chinese naval power. There is no island so well placed either to protect the vast majority of Chinese naval and air bases (to say nothing of naval production facilities), or correspondingly to represent a constant challenge to the Chinese Navy’s ability to deploy force in this vital area.” (Phillips P. O'Brien, Taiwan is “Strategic” and its Fate will Determine the Future of the Asia-Pacific Region, phillipspobrien.substack.com, 1/30/25)
[13] See: Sarah Kirchberger, China's capabilities in underwater naval warfare: technological aspects, in: SIRIUS – Journal for Strategic Analysis, Volume 8, Issue 4 (November 2024)
[14] See: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: United States nuclear weapons 2025, thebulletin.org, January 13, 2025
[15] Other sources count around 200 larger or smaller bases that the US itself owns or uses together with its allies. In Japan, for example, it uses 107 bases, 53 of which it operates on its own; 50,000 soldiers are stationed there, not counting ship crews.
[16] The US has committed itself to its role as the island republic’s protective power not only de facto but also de jure:
“The security of Taiwan and its democracy are key elements of continued peace and stability of the greater Indo-Pacific region, which is in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States.” (Taiwan Assurance Act, 2019)
[17] “While emphasizing support to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan, the document also calls for ‘pressuring’ Taipei to ‘significantly increase’ its defense spending. Trump and his allies have criticized Taiwan as underinvesting in its own defense, urging the self-ruled democratic island to spend up to 10 percent of its GDP on military readiness – a proportion well above what the U.S. and its allies spend on defense.” (Secret Memo on China, The Washington Post, March 29, 2025)
[18] Taiwan’s armed forces have 165,000 active soldiers. In the event of war, the army can call on around 1.6 million reservists; in the future, this number is expected to increase significantly.
[19] “The Pentagon is urging Japan and Australia to clarify what role they would play if the U.S. and China went to war over Taiwan, the Financial Times reported on Saturday. Elbridge Colby, the U.S. under-secretary of defense for policy, has been pushing the matter during recent talks with defense officials of both countries, the report said, citing people familiar with the discussions.” (Reuters, July 12, 2025)
[20] The third important waterway leading out of the China Sea into the Indian Ocean is the Strait of Malacca between the two hitherto neutral states of Malaysia and Indonesia, which is controlled by the US from its base in Singapore.
[21] Japan and South Korea jointly operate a multi-layered missile defense system covering the region (sea- and land-based Aegis system, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense – Thaad), which requires particularly close cooperation between the two countries. Political disputes between them, which had hampered this cooperation, prompted the US government to commit Japan and South Korea to a trilateral agreement under the de facto leadership of the US.
[22] Together with Japan’s 160 warships, South Korea’s approximately 70, Australia's 60, and Taiwan’s 110, roughly half of which are capital ships, the United States, with approximately 200 warships stationed in the Indo-Pacific, also outnumbers China’s navy, which has around 400 ships.
[23] “Japan has significantly enhanced its 194 counterstrike capabilities in recent years, including planned procurement of the 195 Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) and the planned development of upgraded 196 Type-12 Surface-to-Ship Missile (SSM), and development of Hyper Velocity Glide 197 Projectile (HVGP)-Counterstrike Indigenous Capability.” (Admiral Samuel J. Paparo, op. cit.)
[24] “The United States and Japan are working together to modernize U.S.-Japan Alliance roles, missions, and capabilities with a special emphasis on coordinated Command and Control (C2) ... USINDOPACOM is coordinating closely with Japan Joint Staff as they stand up the new 192 Japan Joint Operations Command, and implementing Phase One of the upgrade of U.S. 193 Forces Japan to a Joint Force Headquarters.” (Admiral Samuel J. Paparo, op. cit.)
[25] The missile defense system operated bilaterally with Japan is also of great importance for deterring China, as it devalues part of China’s (nuclear) missile arsenal, which is directed against American bases and, of course, against strategic targets in Japan and South Korea.
[26] The Philippine government needs the power of the US internally to combat communist and Islamist separatism in the southern islands, and externally primarily for the dispute with China over rights of use and passage in the South China Sea. The US provides material and financial support for a need for force that the Philippine economy is far from able to provide. Serving the geostrategic interests of the US has therefore made sense to every Philippine leader to date.
[27] At the instigation of the US, Japan and the Philippines have concluded an agreement that provides for joint maneuvers, mutual military support, and the stationing of weapons and arms deliveries. The Japanese thus secure access to an offshore bastion, while Manila receives modern military equipment in return.
[28] Australia was integrated into the Pacific front of the Cold War. Security cooperation with the US has been contractually agreed upon since the 1950s in a “Defense Treaty” and the “Five Eyes” agreement. Under the latter, America operates one of the world’s largest listening stations in Australia to monitor all of China’s civilian and military space communications.
[29] This accumulation of tasks creates an urgent need for Australia to double its navy. From the American point of view, the expansion of the Australian navy is particularly important and urgent because the People’s Liberation Army’s war fleet outnumbers the US Navy in purely quantitative terms. Washington is therefore expressing its demands on Canberra in dollars: depending on the vehemence of the announcement, Australia is to increase its defense budget to 5 to 10 percent of GDP.
[30] “And we're working with India to co-produce equipment needed to deter aggression. And this includes negotiating an agreement to bring our industrial bases ever closer. Last month, we held our first-ever U.S.-India industry-government experts exchange to produce and field state-of-the-art autonomous systems as part of the U.S.-India Autonomous Systems Industry Alliance.” (Shangri-La speech Hegseth, ibid.)
[31] “Over the past decade, our defense partnership has seen transformative growth through increasingly complex military exercises, defense sales, and strategic dialogue. The U.S. is bolstering our defense partnership with India through operational coordination, information sharing, collaboration with likeminded partners, and defense industrial and technology cooperation. A strong and capable India – in durable partnership with the United States – can help provide security and deter conflict in the Indo-Pacific.” (Admiral Samuel J. Paparo, ibid.)
[32] Up to 40,000 soldiers from 19 nations are participating in the largest military exercise to date, “Talisman Sabre,” in Australia. The Pentagon writes the following about its purpose and objectives:
“Exercises like Talisman Sabre allow us to employ war-winning capabilities, operate in critical locations, signal our multinational resolve and galvanize our collective will. This is how we generate deterrence and work towards our ultimate goal: no war.” (Army Lt. Gen. Joel B. Vowell, U.S. Army Pacific, defense.gov)
The maneuver is taking place not only on land but also at sea in the vicinity of Taiwan.
“One of the most powerful multinational fleets of our time is currently assembling in the waters of the northern Philippine Sea. At its center is the British aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales, accompanied by Japan's JS Kaga and the US USS George Washington. This formidable formation is completed by the amphibious assault ship USS America and several escort vessels from various countries, including the USS Shoup, USS Robert Smalls, JS Teruzuki, the Spanish frigate Méndez Núñez, and other units from Norway, Australia, and Great Britain. Together, these eleven warships represent a concentrated striking force with a long operational range of thousands of kilometers... A naval analyst describes the formation as ‘the most powerful aircraft carrier fleet currently operating in the Pacific.’ The cooperation between the forces is particularly evident on the flight deck of the Prince of Wales, where British and US F-35B fighter jets are operating together... Objective and scope: Operation Highmast 2025 is a multinational military exercise in the Indo-Pacific, led by the British HMS Prince of Wales, which began on April 22, 2025, and lasts eight months. It aims to strengthen partnerships, readiness, and deterrence, with over 35,000 troops from 19 nations, including the USA, Japan, Australia, and Norway. The exercise included complex operations such as air, anti-submarine, and humanitarian missions. Geopolitical significance: The operation responded to China’s growing maritime presence, particularly near the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan, and demonstrated NATO and the Quad’s commitment to a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’. It included port visits to over 40 countries and exercises such as Talisman Sabre in Australia. Technological innovation: As part of AUKUS, the exercise tested advanced technologies such as AI-powered systems and unmanned underwater vehicles to improve integration and interoperability among partner nations. Simultaneously, the United States introduced the hypersonic weapon ‘Dark Eagle’, ushering in a new military era. This weapon is expected to be operational before the end of September. It was tested during the ‘Talisman Sabre 2025’ exercise in Australia, which is part of Operation Highmast. Hypersonic missiles reach speeds exceeding Mach 5.” (Fokus online, August 18, 2025)
Other major military exercises in 2025 include: Exercise Sea Dragon, Balitakan, Iron Fist, Ulchi Freedom Shield, and Elephant Walk.