Translated from GegenStandpunkt 4-2025
Trump’s peace plan for Ukraine
A very dialectical offer to the Russian world power’s struggle to assert itself
Trump’s invitation to a “one-on-one meeting in Alaska” is accepted by the Russian president with satisfaction. The meeting represents his rehabilitation as the leader of a major state power and renders completely moot the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court against him as a war criminal. Putin in any case won’t have to listen to accusations a là “war of aggression” or “violation of international law” from his American host. On the contrary, the like-minded men of power from Moscow and Washington understand each other: Trump shares Putin’s view that a true leader, when his state is refused something or put through whatever it doesn’t have to tolerate given its means of power, has the right, indeed the patriotic duty, to go as far as only he can with his violence in order to assert the rights of his nation; and that success in doing so justifies any slaughter and every human sacrifice. In the sense of might makes right, the first major war in Europe since 1945 is more the fault of the Ukrainian Zelensky, whom Trump publicly berates for engaging in a war against a vastly superior enemy, despite lacking – in Trump's words – “the cards” to play such a game in the first place. From day one, Zelensky has had the nerve to wage a war on the dime of others, and hasn’t even been able to turn the long-term, comprehensive supply of weapons and money from the West into a military success that would justify this support.
By mid-November, Trump is ready urge Zelenskyy – perhaps only temporarily, but in any case ultimately – to agree to a capitulation and accept a peace settlement that would entail heavy losses for Ukraine but reflects the regional balance of power. Before the national and international public, Putin attributes the American initiative to, firstly, an achievement of his weapons and warriors and, secondly, to a more sensible self-restraint on the part of American power, which will now be concentrating on the pursuit of its national interests and stepping back from presumptions of “global hegemony.”[1] The first point is at best only partially true, the second not at all – and the Russian leadership also documents this through the problems that Trump’s peace plan raises for them: Russia just hasn’t achieved the kind of victory over Ukraine that would allow it to dictate the terms of peace after a capitulation. If Zelenskyy capitulates, it must then be to Trump, who – by withdrawing America’s participation in the war (arms deliveries, reconnaissance, target data) – will deprive him of the indispensable prerequisites for his ability to wage war. And it is Trump who presents the Russians with peace terms with which they should be content. This is by no means a retreat from the role of a global superpower that assigns all other states their rank and the scope of their rights. Trump simply defines America’s status differently than Biden: a world order that the USA, together with its European allies, protects on the basis of a united military might that no state can stand up to, that combats and dooms to failure any unilateral use of military force by other states, and that consequently from the outset doesn’t tolerate any rival power capable of waging world war, especially if that power actually takes up arms – Trump no longer considers such a collective world order of the West to be the foundation of American global hegemony. He uses the absolutely exceptional status of wealth and power achieved by the USA through this order in the interest of an unconditional national freedom of action that belongs exclusively to the USA.
In this sense, he no longer gives the Ukraine war the global political meaning that was the reason the united West under Biden had stoked and managed it, and takes the form of the world political conflict – a war between Russia and Ukraine fought on its territory – for the substance; he declares it a regional conflict between two unequal adversaries in which nothing is at stake for US power, which therefore only gets in the way of America’s use of both countries and should be ended as quickly as possible.
For Russia, this definition of the situation initially contains the good news that the West’s war against it – conceived as a decisive conflict over the world order and scaled accordingly – has effectively been called off. Its destruction through military attrition on Ukrainian fronts in combination with economic strangulation is no longer the guiding principle of America’s dealings with Russia.
Yet the fact remains: Russia didn’t start the war simply to emerge from it unscathed. Nor was proving its invincibility on the Ukrainian battlefield the starting point for the massive and protracted carnage which Russia ultimately unleashed in Eastern Europe; and certainly not the annexation of Ukrainian territory, along with the dogged demonstration that no one can wrest it back, the reason for its military offensive in Ukraine. So what was it then?
Putin gives at least a hint:
“The Ukraine crisis is not a territorial conflict, and I want to make that clear. Russia is the world’s largest country in terms of land area, and we have no interest in conquering additional territory. We still have much to do to properly develop Siberia, Eastern Siberia, and the Russian Far East. This is not a territorial conflict and not an attempt to establish regional geopolitical balance. The issue is much broader and more fundamental and is about the principles underlying the new international order.” (Putin, Valdai speech 2023)
The issue can obviously no longer be that NATO’s practices became so intolerable to Russia that it decided in 2022 to begin its – likewise intended to be final – war against them. It was intended to, firstly, stop and, secondly, reverse the status of the Western seizure of Ukraine that had by then already been achieved. For NATO’s military-strategic appropriation of Ukraine has had the purpose, well understood by Russia, of confining it and all its military capabilities to its own territory, depriving it of any strategic freedom of movement by advancing NATO’s strategic offensive and defensive potential right up to its western border, and thus devaluing its gigantic conventional and non-conventional destructive potential. However, the Russian Federation’s ability to autonomously define the scope of its vital interests, to enforce respect for them from all other state powers, and thus to help shape the global relations of force as an active agent, hinges on the free use of these military escalation capabilities, which can be escalated to the ultimate level. The offensive denial of this claim through the intervention of the American-led NATO into Ukraine – with the prospect of eliminating Russia as such a power altogether – was the reason for the Russian war; the enforcement of its final recognition as a world power was its purpose.
The global political significance that the war over Ukraine has for Russia is simply ignored, dismissed as pointless, when Trump sees it as merely a regional conflict he has no time for. The fact that Russia wants to assert itself, even in relation to the USA, as a world power that can’t be bypassed, to exorcize the USA’s hostility towards it, as well as that of any other contenders, and to compel them to respect Russian claims – Trump implicitly rejects all this just by saying he doesn’t think America is all that affected by the war in Eastern Europe. Neither a regional demonstration of power or even growth in Russian power can challenge the American superpower – let alone provoke a hostile confrontation carrying the risk of a world war.
From the outset, Trump positions himself above the warring states, including his European allies; he does not measure his superpower status by their power potential, nor does he see it as being challenged by them. He sees no need to assert or fight for the special status of his superior nation, but assumes it is simply a given, and approaches the warring parties in such a way that they have to sign off on this ranking – precisely by using extortion to broker his Eastern European peace with all its adversaries – between Russia and Ukraine, and also between Russia and NATO, of which he is the leader and from which he simultaneously distances himself. Trump is showing all sides that they cannot afford to reject his offer.
It is no contradiction to this demonstration of American supremacy that Trump, in his original 28-point plan, concedes to Russia – the regionally dominant power that can’t be denied anything on the ground that it is capable of seizing short of world war – precisely what in European capitals is bemoaned as an outrageous demand for Zelensky to surrender – although, in reality, it is directed against them: the mostly attained Russian war aims in relation to Ukraine: recognition of the conquered regions, permanent ban on Ukrainian NATO membership, no further NATO expansion in Europe, partial demilitarization of the Kyiv regime, reinstatement of Russian as a second official language, an end to sanctions, etc. According to this preliminary plan, Russia is to have all of this conceded, enforced, and monitored vis-à-vis all parties to the conflict – by the USA.
The contradiction that Trump’s peace initiative poses for the Russian leadership – a look back to the time between the Alaska Summit and the 28-point plan
The Anchorage summit, where Trump and Putin explored the possibilities for peace on their own, to the exclusion, and clearly against the desires, of both Ukraine and the leading European powers, raises the question among Russia’s foreign policy elite as to whether this represents its recognition as an equal world power or the opposite?
As mentioned, Putin interprets the meeting in Alaska as an end to Western hegemony and the USA’s coming to terms with the multipolarity of global power relations, which is supported primarily by Russia.[2] The most clearly opposing view is held by foreign policy expert Karaganov:
“Everything that now looks like a lucrative deal for Trump is, for Russia, another trap set by the West. Trump can hold us back until we achieve complete victory. Trump fundamentally benefits from this war. It gives him the opportunity to gain allies and impose his will not only on Russia or China with his sanctions, but also on the rest of the world. Russia has found itself in a situation where it has to negotiate, since Trump is offering some quite acceptable conditions. This does not mean that, even if Trump negotiates, both Trump’s America and Trump’s allies will fulfill these conditions, or that this agreement will fully serve Russia’s security interests. Even if we agree, for example, that four regions plus Crimea will be fully ceded to us, the question of the regime in Ukraine will remain unresolved. And the question of whether the Europeans, furious with rage over their failures and whipped into a frenzy by their hatred of Russia, will withdraw their support for the war. That will remain unsettled. Therefore, I do not believe that this meeting will lead to anything, not will it have a positive outcome. This is a small step toward a possible solution to Europe’s security problems, which stem from the fact that, after the end of the Cold War, the West continued its de facto aggression against Russia through NATO expansion. Even if this aggression is stopped, the problem will not yet be solved. So let’s wait and give the president a chance to reach an agreement. However, I do not have high hopes for the implementation of these agreements. Then a new process will begin. I believe that in any case, at least with regard to Europe, we must push for nuclear escalation. They must be brought to their senses before this failing elite drives the world into another world war because of its internal problems.” (Souzveche-ru, August 15, 2025)
This expert on world power sees a peace brokered by Trump as a way of hindering a Russian victory: Anything Russia doesn’t win for itself and guarantee with its own power is not guaranteed. Even if Trump offers favorable peace terms, “we” would be putting “our” security in foreign hands and making “ourselves” dependent on their still hostile will. Karaganov points out everything that such a peace with and under Trump would fail to resolve: the persistence of the anti-Russian regime in Kyiv and the determination of the EU powers to push Russia out of Europe mean that Russia must continue to defend itself; and it must not waver in its determination.
The days and weeks following the summit demonstrate to the Russians just how justified this perspective on the event is: The EU powers, plus Great Britain, fear any American-Russian rapprochement and do their utmost to thwart any moves in that direction. They create a coalition of the willing with money and weapons to ensure that Ukraine does not have to immediately give up the war at Trump’s behest; furthermore, they intend to shape the peace that Trump wants and that they, like it or not, fall into line behind, by influencing its terms so as to set back Russia. After all, these terms were not yet established following the initial agreement in Alaska: The Europeans intervened in Trump’s peace process – which he initiated over their heads – by declaring their “readiness” to deploy “peacekeeping troops” intended to serve as a combat-ready safeguard against the presumed continuation of Russian aggression. Even after the cessation of the war, Russia will remain for them the enemy which they, on the side of Ukraine, want to keep in check. Furthermore, they plan to upgrade this outpost of their power over Europe into a heavily armed, anti-Russian bulwark – with or without NATO ties.
Russia can’t accept this.[3] The design of the security guarantees will ultimately determine whether, with its nearly four years of military self-assertion against the united West, Russia has prevailed as a world power at least vis-à-vis the EU powers, whose security interests must be respected and whose international influence can’t be curtailed, or whether, after the war, it finds itself in a position much like the pre-war situation that drove it to take up arms. Russia is therefore continuing its war, even escalating it with increasingly extensive air strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure – now clearly aimed at pressuring Trump to improve his peace offer so that it aligns more closely with Russian war aims.
It becomes apparent that Trump, because Putin does not agree to a ceasefire immediately and without specifying further conditions, feels disappointed, betrayed, and strung along by him. Trump doesn’t view his offer to readmit Russia to the circle of respectable powers and allow it to retain its battlefield gains as an understanding between autonomous powers, but rather as a dictate to be obeyed within a reasonable timeframe. The US President interprets Russia’s defiance as an act of rebellion against the established hierarchy between the two states, which he considers a settled matter. Through his own escalation measures – such as authorizing the use of target data for Ukrainian drones and missiles against sites deep inside Russia, and hinting at the possible delivery of long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles – he is, as he says, raising the price for Moscow in order to “force it to the negotiating table.”
Putin, in turn, declares that a delivery of Tomahawk missiles would amount to the USA’s direct entry into the war, which will be assessed and answered accordingly.[4] He reminds his counterpart Trump that, since taking office, Trump has been committed to ending this war and that a direct confrontation, let alone one potentially on the level of world war, with Russia can’t be in his interest. Thus, both sides have set the premises for more of the diplomacy which led to the 28-point plan and was met with sheer horror in Ukraine and Europe.
[1] “Indeed, the power of the United States and its allies reached its peak at the end of the 20th century. But there has never been, nor will there ever be, a force capable of ruling the world, dictating everyone how to act, how to live, even how to breathe. Such attempts have been made, but every one of them has failed … International relations are undergoing a radical transformation. Paradoxically, multipolarity has become a direct consequence of attempts to establish and preserve global hegemony, a response by the international system and history itself to the obsessive desire to arrange everyone into a single hierarchy, with Western countries at the top... The current White House administration is very straightforward about its interests, stating what it wants directly – even bluntly at times, as I am sure you will agree – but without unnecessary hypocrisy. It is always preferable to be clear about what the other party wants and what they are trying to achieve... We can see that the current US administration is guided primarily by its own national interests – as it understands them. And I believe this is a rational approach.” (Putin, Valdai speech, October 3, 2025)
[2] Looking back, Putin sees this not only as a sign of the respect his nation has long been denied, so that one world power can now once again interact with another on equal footing: “Russia is also entitled to be guided by its own national interests. One of which, by the way, is the restoration of full-fledged relations with the United States. Regardless of our disagreements, if two parties treat each other with respect, then their negotiations – even the most challenging, stubborn bargaining – will still be aimed at finding common ground.” He views Russia’s claim to be an indispensable world power as simply an objective necessity of the international system, one that has been confirmed by events: “It turns out that the very global system they wanted to expel us from simply refuses to let Russia go. Because it needs Russia as an essential part of the global balance: not only because of our territory, our population, our defence, technological and industrial potential, or our mineral wealth – although, of course, all of these are critically important factors. But above everything else, the global balance cannot be built without Russia: neither the economic balance nor the strategic balance, nor the cultural or logistical one. None at all.” (Discussion at the Valdai Conference, October 2, 2025)
[3] Lavrov voices this sentiment when he accuses “European elites” of being “willing only to provide guarantees against Russia, and not with Russia.” (JW, Oct. 29, 2025) The deployment of the peacekeeping forces proposed by Europe in post-war Ukraine would amount to an “unacceptable foreign military intervention on part of Ukrainian territory” (rbc-ru, Aug. 19, 2025). Moscow sees no room for compromise regarding the deployment of foreign peacekeeping forces in Ukraine. He claimed that this discussion is being conducted “with openly hostile intent” and that Ukraine’s allies “do not even hide why they need them.” (gazeta-ru, Mar. 12, 2025)
[4] Putin in the discussion following the Valdai speech: “Will this [the delivery of Tomahawks] damage our relations considering that we have finally started seeing light at the end of tunnel? Of course, this would be detrimental to our relations. How can it be otherwise? You cannot use the Tomahawks without the US military personnel’s direct involvement. This would signal the advent of a totally new stage in this escalation, including in terms of Russia’s relations with the United States.”